Landlord and Tenant -- Retaliatory Eviction and the Absolute Right to Choose Not to Have Any Tenants by Gardner, O. Max, III
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 51 | Number 1 Article 15
11-1-1972
Landlord and Tenant -- Retaliatory Eviction and
the Absolute Right to Choose Not to Have Any
Tenants
O. Max Gardner III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
O. M. Gardner III, Landlord and Tenant -- Retaliatory Eviction and the Absolute Right to Choose Not to Have Any Tenants, 51 N.C. L. Rev.
162 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol51/iss1/15
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment in Generes, was sufficient to prevent an unduly broad allowance
of deductions in this area. An example of the effect which the Generes
opinion could have upon Cremona would be if a taxpayer paid an em-
ployment agency fee to locate a new job in exactly the same trade or
business and his dominant motive for changing jobs was a nonbusiness
motive, such as a change of cliiinate. If the Cremona criterion were used
alone, the deduction would be allowed since this was an attempt to get
a new job in the same trade or business. However, because the dominant
motive for the expense was a nonbusiness purpose, the deduction would
not be allowed under Generes.
When the Tax Court ceased to use the job-securing requirement for
determining the deductibility of employment agency fees, it repudiated
a test which was both unfair to the taxpayer and illogical in relation to
section 16241 of the Internal Revenue Code. But the job-securing distinc-
tion did have one appealing advantage-it was definite and consequently
easy to apply. The same trade or business test, applied alone, is both
fair and logical in that it allows a deduction for an expense which is
related to the taxpayer's trade or business. Unfortunately, it is presently
undeveloped and offers no definite guidelines for the taxpayer. Addi-
tionally, it may be difficult to develop clear and definite guidelines due
to the difficulty in determining a subjective factor such as the dominant
motive and the room for interpretation in determining whether the new
employment is within the same trade or business. In the area of educa-
tional empense deductions, where the same trade or business criterion
has been used for years,42 the persisting uncertainty as to whether spe-
cific deductions will be allowed portends equal future uncertainty in
predicting the deductibility of employment agency fees.
WILLIAM S. PATTERSON
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction and the Absolute Right to
Choose Not to Have Any Tenants
When a landlord is unwilling to bring his rental units into compli-
ance with housing code provisions, does his ownership of the property
include the absolute right to discontinue rental of all such units? If so,
4 See note 2 supra.
12See note 34 supra.
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does the same absolute right exist when the landlord elects to discon-
tinue rental of some but not all of his units? The court in Robinson v.
Diamond Housing Corp.' attempted to answer these questions for the
District of Columbia.
Under common law principles, the tenant only had the right to
possession of the leased premises. 2 Thus, the landlord was under no duty
to make repairs or to keep the premises in a habitable condition.3 In
an agrarian society where the tenant rented the land primarily for the
production of crops and the buildings located thereon were merely inci-
dental,4 it may have been equitable to place the burden of repair on the
tenant. However, the plight of the low-income urban resident has forced
several jurisdictions to make a thorough reassessment of landlord-
tenant law as it is applied to the modern residential leasehold.5
Much of this judicial activism has been the result of legislative
failures. Congress attempted to remedy this situation, and, in promul-
gating a national housing policy of a "decent home" for every
American,' expressly recognized the importance of local housing codes
by conditioning monetary aid to municipalities on their adoption of such
codes.7 In order to meet the objectives of this federal policy and to
qualify for federal funds, thousands of municipalities have promulgated
housing codes and regulations.8 However, local agencies responsible for
enforcement of the codes have not been able to significantly halt or
reverse the deterioration of urban buildings.'
'No. 24,508 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
3For an extremely harsh application of this principle see Fowler v. Butt, 6 Mass. 63 (1809).
In addition, see Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-Demise of
the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 955,971 n.83 (1971) and citations
there listed.
'2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 106-17 (2d ed. 1923).
5For general discussion on the plight of low-income tenants see Feldman, Effective Remedies
for Tenants, 93 N.J.L.J. 481 (1970); Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in
Frustration. 21 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1970); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A
Critical Evaluation of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969);
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966).
642 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
742 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1970).
'For an example see D.C. Housing Regs. (1955), cited in Daniels, Judicial and Legislative
Remedies For Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform In The District of Columbia,
59 GEo. L.J. 909, 913 (1971).
'The ineffectiveness of housing codes is discussed in F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING
CODE VIOLATIONS 113 (1968); Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions andReme-
dies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255-56 (1966); Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating
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Due to these legislative shortcomings, several jurisdictions have
adopted the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship
with an implied warranty of habitability and fitness.10 In order to protect
tenants who elected to exercise these new rights, a few jurisdictions have
also prohibited the landlord from terminating a tenancy where he had
a legal right to do so, but where he was motivated by a desire to retaliate
against the tenant."
The District of Columbia (especially the United States Court of
Appeals) has led the way with its innovative judicial response to the
plight of low-income tenants. In Edwards v. Habib2 it was held that a
landlord could not oust his tenant with a suit for possession in order to
punish the tenant for reporting housing code violations to governmental
authorities. This decision was followed by Brown v. Southall Realty
Co.13 where the court held that a lease purporting to convey property
burdened with substantial housing code violations was illegal and void.
Thus, under Brown, the landlord is not entitled to gain possession for
rent due under the invalid lease. Javins v. First National Realty Corp.14
further expanded the rights of tenants by holding that the warranty of
habitability was to be measured by the standards set out in the housing
regulations and incorporated by implication into all leases, whether oral
or written. Javins also conditioned the tenant's obligation to pay rent
upon the landlord's performance of his obligations, including the im-
to Real Property, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 280 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 824 (1965).
'*For recent decisions implying the warranty of habitability see Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d II (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462
P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I11. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, I11 N.W.2d 409
(1961).
"The leading case is Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969). Other jurisdictions have recognized the defense in the following cases: McQueen v.
Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); Dickhut
v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970). On retaliatory evictions generally see
Moskovitz, Retaliatory Evictions-The Law and the Facts, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 4 (1969);
Schoshinski, supra note 5, at 541-52; Editorial Note, Retaliatory Evictions and the Reporting of
Housing Code Violations in the District of Columbia, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 190 (1967); Note,
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Clv. LIB. L. REv. 193 (1967);
Note, Retaliatory Evictions-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 700 (1967).
12397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
13237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
"428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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plied warranty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition.
Although Javins, Brown, and Edwards were all landmark cases in
landlord-tenant law, Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.'5 may well
be the most significant of all. The events of the case began on May 2,
1968, when Mrs. Lena Robinson and her four children moved into a row
house owned by Diamond Housing. Prior to executing the month-to-
month rental agreement, Mrs. Robinson allegedly received assurance
from the landlord that major repairs would shortly be made." However,
the landlord subsequently reneged on his alleged promise, and Mrs.
Robinson began withholding rent. Suit was then instituted for posses-
sion. Mrs. Robinson successfully defended this action on grounds that
the lease was unenforceable and void due to the existence of substantial
housing code violations at the time the lease was. signed.1
7
Undaunted by this initial set-back, Diamond instituted a second
suit based on the theory that Mrs. Robinson was a trespasser since the
first action had declared the lease void. The trial court dismissed the suit
and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. 8 The court
held that Mrs. Robinson was not a trespasser, but that "having entered
possession under a void and unenforceable lease [she] became a tenant
at sufferance."' 9 However, the Court added that the tenancy, "like any
other tenancy at sufferance, may be terminated on thirty days' notice."
2
In interpreting the housing code it was further stated:
The Housing Regulations do not compel an owner of housing
property to rent his property . . . . [I]f the landlord is unwilling or
unable to put the property in a habitable condition, he may and should
promptly terminate the tenancy and withdraw the property from the
rental market .... 2'
Diamond, relying on the above dicta, instituted a third action for
possession based on the statutory thirty-day notice to quit.22 In support
of its action, an affidavit was filed stating that Diamond was unwilling
"No. 24,508 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
"Id. at 4; see id. at 5 for a listing of the housing code violations existing at the inception of
the lease.
"Id. at 5. Mrs. Robinson's defense was based on Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834
(D.C. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).




"D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-902, -904 (1967).
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to make the repairs necessary to comply with the housing code and
furthermore that it intended to take the unit off the rental market. Mrs.
Robinson based her defense on the alleged retaliatory motive of the
landlord in seeking to oust her from possession of the premises. 3
The trial court granted Diamond's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the "retaliatory defense" of Edwards v. Habib was unavailable as
a matter of law in such situations. 4
On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was presented with the primary question: Would
the landlord be permitted to evade the Edwards prohibition of retalia-
tory evictions?" Diamond argued that to permit the defense of retalia-
tory eviction at such a protracted point may mean that it would never
be able to recover possession of its property. Equally important, Dia-
mond contended that all landlords, regardless of any limitations im-
posed by law concerning the choice of tenants, had an absolute right to
choose not to have any tenants."
In response to these contentions, the court found that the attempted
partial closing could have a "chilling effect" on the assertion of pro-
tected rights by other tenants. In brief, the court feared that such dis-
criminatory closings would intimidate the remaining tenants into non-
action .2  Accordingly, due to the "inherently destructive" effect such
closings may have, the court held that the jury should have been free to
presume that the landlord was motivated by the desire to retaliate .2
"Once [this] presumption is established, it is then up to the landlord to
rebut it by demonstrating that he is motivated by some legitimate busi-
ness purpose rather than by the illicit motive which would otherwise be
presumed. 129
23See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
2'Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833, 835 (D.C. App. 1970).
2ln Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the same court had taken judicial
notice of the apparently rising incidents of possessory actions based on notices to quit following
closely on the heels of possessory actions based on nonpayment of rent.
26No. 24,508, at 17-18; cf. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (suggesting that landlord take unit off market if unwilling or unable to repair the
premises).
"No. 24,508, at 10. "There is thus a real danger that landlords may find it in their interest to
sacrifice the profits derived from operation of a few units in order to intimidate the rest of their
tenants." Id.
21Id. at 19.
2Id.; cf. NLRB v.Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 228, 231 (1963).
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In rejecting Diamond's contention that it had an absolute right to
go out of business, the court relied on a passage from the labor law case
of Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.:30
The closing of an entire business, even though discriminatory, ends the
employer-employee relationship; the force of such a closing is entirely
spent as to that business when termination of the enterprise takes
place. On the other hand, a discriminatory partial closing may have
repercussions on what remains of the business, affording the employer
leverage for discouraging the free exercise of § 7 rights among the
remaining employees .... 31
In the Darlington case, Deering Milliken Corporation, which oper-
ated seventeen textile manufacturing plants in the South, decided to
cease operations at its Darlington, South Carolina, plant after the union
won a representation election. Following the closing of the plant, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the closure was
based on an anti-union motivation.
The Labor Board, by a divided vote, upheld the charges against
Deering Milliken, 32 but the court of appeals refused to enforce the
Board's decision.3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed and held that a closing in one part of a large enterprise is an
unfair labor practice if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any
of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer
reasonably could have forseen that such closing would likely have that
effect.34
The Robinson court, in reliance on Darlington, thus drew a distinc-
tion between a landlord's absolute right to go out of business altogether
and his more limited right to discontinue part of his enterprise so as to
benefit the rest. Specifically, the court held:
While the judiciary may be powerless to control landlords who no
longer wish to remain landlords, it can prevent landlords from con-
ducting their business in a way that chills the legally protected rights
of tenants . . ..
-380 U.S. 263 (1965).
'lid. at 274-75.
3Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
3Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
11380 U.S. at 274-75.
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* * ' Thus we hold that the landlord's right to discontinue rental
of all his units in no way justifies a partial closing designed to intimi-
date the remaining tenants. 5
It is interesting to note that the Robinson decision does not com-
pletely follow the actual holding in the Darlington case. Darlington
required proof of an illegal purpose on the part of the employer to "chill
unionism" in any of his remaining plants;" Robinson, on the other
hand, allowed a presumption that the intent of the landlord was to
coerce his remaining tenants into non-assertion of their rights." Hence
it is arguable that the Robinson court overlooked an important limiting
factor which the Darlington decision recognized: the right to go out of
business even in view of the protected rights of the employees. Because
of the collision of these disparate rights, the Darlington court refused
to base its decision on a presumption of motive. Thus it is arguable that
if the landlord's motive in Robinson was to "chill" the legally protected
rights of his remaining tenants, proof of such motive was an essential
condition precedent for the tenants' cause of action. In fact, based on
the Darlington analogy, it was mandatory.38
However, the Robinson court resolved this apparent conflict with
Darlington by drawing a further analogy to labor law. In particular, the
court employed a labor law test used to determine when the employer's
acts have constituted discrimination in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act.39
The majority of labor law cases in this area have required proof of
an "unlawful purpose" on the part of the employer." However, under
some circumstances, the employer's actions have been determined so
"inherently destructive" of important employee rights that no proof of
an anti-union motivation is needed.4 Under those circumstances, the
" No. 24,508, at 10, 23.
1380 U.S. at 274-75.
"No. 24,508, at 21.
"Cf. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (employwer may hire replace-
ments during a strike in order to continue his business and is not required to discharge them
afterwards even if it means denying reinstatement to strikers).
"9See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221 (1963).
4See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Edward G. Budd Mfg, Co. v.
NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944). But cf. Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
"Both the Labor Board and the United States Supreme Court have generally applied the
"inherently destructive" terminology to situations where the actions of the employer substantially
impinge upon the right of the, employees to strike. Usually, the actions of the employer operate to
[Vol. 5 1
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Labor Board can find an unfair labor practice even after the employer
has introduced evidence that his conduct was motivated by legitimate
business considerations.42
In adopting this labor law presumption of motive, the Robinson
court appears to have promulgated the following guidelines:
(1) If the tenant produces specific evidence of the landlord's
retaliatory motive, then the landlord, absent proof of any legitimate
business motive, will be prohibited from evicting the tenant.43
(2) If the landlord fails to come forward with a legitimate busi-
ness justification for the removal of the unit, then the jury may pre-
sume the landlord's actions to be retaliatory.44
(3) If the landlord's removal of the unit is both retaliatory and
is supported by a legitimate business justification, then the jury must
determine which motive was the causative factor.45
Notwithstanding this apparent resolution of the conflict with the
Darlington case, it is important to note one further discrepancy. In
particular, the labor law cases relied on for the presumption-of-motive
test were all related to employer actions taken against lawful strikers
which did not involve, as did Darlington, the decision to completely go
out of business.46 These two situations are distinguishable in that a
decision to terminate the entire business extinguishes by implication the
protected rights of the employees by precluding any remedial response
by the Labor Board. In short, the employer cannot be ordered to rein-
state the discharged employees in a business that no longer exists. On
the other hand, the cases pertaining to discrimination against lawful
strikers all involve continuing business enterprises. As a result, the rein-
statement order is a realistic remedy in such situations. Thus, it is
arguable that the Robinson court made an erroneous analogy.
Finally, after holding that the landlord could not close the rental
discriminate between strikers and non-strikers. The leading examples are NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (employer refused to pay strikers vacation benefits accrued prior to
the strike); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (employer offered 20 years addi-
tional seniority both to replacements and to strikers who agreed to return to work).
"In these cases it is necessary for the Labor Board and the court to balance the significance
of the employer's interest against the impingement of such interest upon the exercise of protected
employee rights.
"3This is basically the Edwards v. Habib "retaliatory defense."
"No. 24,508, at 21.
'lid. at 23.
"See note 41 supra.
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unit and that his retaliatory motive could be presumed, the Robinson
court confronted the problem of the landlord who is unwilling, but not
unable, to repair code violations and is therefore prevented from either
evicting the tenant or collecting rent.47 Under such circumstances, it was
held that the tenant is entitled to have the premises made habitable
through a code enforcement action by the housing authorities or by a
proper suit instituted by the tenant. 48
Although the District of Columbia case law provided substantial
remedies for tenants prior to Robinson, the effectiveness of such reme-
dies was questionable due to the apparent statutory eviction procedure
left open to the landlord.49 For instance, the Javins opinion itself ap-
peared to hold out to the landlord a means of eviction based on retalia-
tion when it stated: "Our holding, of course, affects only eviction for
nonpayment of rent. The landlord is free to seek eviction at the termina-
tion of the lease or on any other legal ground."50 Thus Javins implied
that the landlord could evict that same tenant who had the month before
proven the existence of housing code violations by simply giving the
thirty-day statutory notice to quit.
Therefore the Robinson decision is important in that it closes most
of the "gaps" left by the prior decisions. The opinion is based on the
fundamental premise that "the scope and effectiveness of tenant reme-
dies for substandard housing will be determined by the degree of protec-
tion given tenants against retaliatory actions by the landlord."',
' In response to these "gaps," the Edwards v. Habib5" decision pro-
vided that the tenant may defeat an eviction based on a thirty-day notice
4 However, the court stated that [n]one of this is to say that the landlord may not go out of
business entirely if he wishes to do so or that the jury is authorized to inspect his motives if he
chooses to commit economic hara-kiri." No. 24,508, at 23.
4 This right of the tenant was recognized in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), where the court stated, "In extending all co tract
remedies for breach to the parties to a lease, we include an action for specific performance of the
landlord's implied warranty of habitability." Id. at 1082 n.61.
4 See, e.g., Note, D. C. Housing Regulations, Article 290, Section 2902: Construed pursuant
to Brown v. Southall Realty Co. and Javins v. First National Realty Corp.-A new day for the
urban tenant?, 16 How. L.J. 366, 374 (1971); Recent Cases, Landlord and Tenant- Warranty of
Habitability-Proof of Housing Code Violations Which Occur During the Term of a Lease Are
Admissible When Offered as a Defense to an Eviction Action for the Nonpayment of Rent, 39 U.
CIN. L. REv. 600 (1970).
0428 F.2d at 1083 n.64.
5
'Daniels, supra note 8, at 943.
52397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
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if the action of the landlord was improper. 3 However, the Edwards
decision did not go so far as to say that the landlord's decision to take
the rental unit off the market would be sufficient to raise the presump-
tion of a retaliatory motive. Therefore, Robinson now has established
such a presumption and represents a substantial victory for the tenant.
The use of labor law analogy, by the court was questionable, but it
must be recognized that Washington, D. C., "is confronted by a serious
shortage of housing . . . rentals." 54 Much of the city's good housing is
plagued by over-use and insufficient maintenance.5 In addition, a sub-
stantial percentage of the housing units in the District are substandard
or overcrowded. 6 When these factors are combined with the express
holdings of Edwards, Javins, and Brown (as well as the District of
Columbia Landlord-Tenant Regulations patterned after them),57 it ap-
pears that there was no alternative holding by which the Robinson court
could have preserved the rights of tenants.
Any other decision would have in effect permitted retaliatory evic-
tions. Such a course would have violated both the Edwards prohibition
and the District of Columbia Housing Regulations. However, in another
sense, the decision is extraordinary. The landlord may never be able to
evict the tenant so long as he is motivated by a desire to rid himself of
the tenant, even if he has a legitimate business reason for such an
eviction. More importantly, the "mere desire to take the unit off the
market is by itself [never] a legitimate business reason which will justify
an eviction."58
Thus, in the final analysis, the Robinson decision appears to raise
difficult questions regarding the supply, maintenance, and availability
of adequate low-income housing.59 Specifically, they include:
OId. at 699.
"NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMM'N, PROBLEMS OF HOUSING PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. 53 (1966).
5Id. at 51; see Brief for Appellee at 38-40, Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., No. 24,508
(D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
"METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, HOUSING GAP QUANTIFICA-
TION: A METHODOLOGY 34-35 (1968), cited in Brief for Appellee at 41 n.42, Robinson v. Diamond
Housing Corp., No. 24,508 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
"D.C. Landlord-Tenant Regs. §§ 2902.1(a), (b), 2902.2, 2910 (1970), quoted in Daniels, supra
note 8, at 958, 960.
"No. 24,508, at 20.
"See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COIfM. ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME 68-73
(1968).
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(1) Will it be impossible for landlords to absorb the cost of bringing
their units into compliance with the housing code, thus driving addi-
tional low-cost housing off the market?"
(2) If this decision does result in the decrease of low-cost housing,
then who shall develop, own, and manage such housing?
(3) If private enterprise is unable or unwilling to finance these mas-
sive repairs, should the government assume full responsibility for the
construction, maintenance, and operation of a nationwide system of
low-income housing?
It must be remembered that the only justification for this decision
is that it will serve to "increase rather than decrease the stock of habita-
ble housing in the District of Columbia."'" In thie event this result does
not follow, the justification collapses, and there is no further policy basis
for the decision.
0. MAX GARDNER III
Medical Jurisprudence-Determining the Time of Death of the Heart
Transplant Donor
Over the past twenty years medical science has made phenomenal
strides in the areas of resuscitation, life support, and organ transplanta-
tion.' With the first human heart transplant 2 the medical and legal
communities were forced to re-assess their positions on many legal and
ethical issues. Because the heart is a vital and non-paired organ, a heart
transplant necessarily results in the death of the donor. Also, it is
necessary to remove the heart from the transplant donor as soon as
possible after respiratory failure occurs. Because the heart tissue begins
to deteriorate immediately upon termination of its oxygen supply, delay
"The Robinson court concluded that this danger is largely imagined, citing only Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies
and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
"No. 24,508, at 27-28.
'See Harvard Medical Shool Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
Report: A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
2The first human heart transplant was performed on Dec. 3, 1967 by Dr. Christiaan Barnard
on Louis Washkansky at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. R. PORzio, THE
TRNSPLANT AGE 17 (1969).
3See, e.g., Timmes, The Cardiac Surgeon's Viewpoint, in THE MOMENT OF DEATH 14 (A.
Winter ed. 1969). The living donor from whom a kidney has been removed can survive on one
normal kidney.
[Vol. 51
